





LOGISTICS AND EXPORTS 
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Drawing on a new and comprehensive measure of logistics quality, our gravity model 
suggests logistics in the exporting and partner-country can have an important impact on 
bilateral exports. A one standard deviation improvement in the exporter’s logistics 
quality, which for example would improve Gabon to the level of Guinea, would raise 
exports by almost 60%.  Landlocked countries’ exports depend on their neighbours’ 
logistics, but their own logistics quality is not as important as for other countries. We also 
find that logistics act to reduce the trade effects of distance, but without eliminating them. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Although tariffs on industrial products have generally declined, non-tariff barriers to trade remain. One 
example of non-tariff barriers is the cost of transporting goods to foreign markets (Nordås & Piermartini, 
2004). As argued in Brun, Carrere, Guillaumont & de Melo (2005), transport costs associated with 
distance are still material – distance is not dead. The length of time goods take to ship, and the 
uncertainty potentially associated with the time are also costly to potential exporters (Hummels, 2001). 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) provide a summary of the costs of trade. They estimate that 
international trade costs are equivalent to a 74 per cent ad valorem tariff for a typical product between 
developed countries. 
Buys, Deichman & Wheeler (2006) calculate that their programme of road network expansion in Africa 
would increase trade by $250 billion over 15 years at a cost of $20 billion plus $1 billion per year. The case 
for roads may be compelling, but roads are not everything. Freight costs have inter alia been attributed to 
aspects affecting the broader infrastructure, including rail, ports and communications (Clark, Dollar & 
Micco, 2004; Limao & Venables, 2001). Uncertainty interacts with the transport infrastructure – tarred 
roads are less likely to be flooded than gravel ones after a storm – but could also be due to a lack of 
transparency and reliability in customs procedures. Through this transport cost channel, a number of 
studies have associated the quality of infrastructure with trade volumes (Clarke et al, 2004; Limao & 
Venables, 2001; Wilson & Otsuki, 2005; Nordås & Piermartini, 2004). More generally, Calderon & Serven 
(2008) analyse the role of infrastructure in broader economic development. 
We contribute to the literature by making use of a new index of logistics developed by the World Bank to 
investigate the relationships between logistics and bilateral exports. This new index offers a number of 
advantages. It draws on a wide range of criteria. In addition to physical infrastructure, it incorporates inter 
alia measures of expertise and of customs clearance. It stems from a single source, and is based on 
detailed evaluations provided by logistics professionals (Arvis, Muster et al, 2007). 
In a gravity framework, we find that the logistics of both the source and destination country are 
associated with bilateral exports. We also find that good logistics can reduce effective distance, but, 
paraphrasing Brun et al (2005), logistics cannot kill it.  
We also investigate whether logistics in the countries’ neighbours play a role in bilateral exports. 
Neighbours can be important when exports form part of a regional supply chain,1 but can be particularly 
important for landlocked countries. Apart from airfreight, landlocked countries rely on the logistics of 
their neighbours to send goods overseas.  
Our results indicate that bordering countries’ logistics are not important, except  for the landlocked 
exporters. Also, the landlocked’s own logistics are less important. Furthermore, the quality of the 
destination country’s neighbours’ logistics is negatively related to exports to that country. This may be 
because there is more competition in the choice of export destination: countries choosing amongst 
various drop off points may decide to send their exports to the relatively well-equipped countries before 
allowing regional distributors to take over.    
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews work on the role of infrastructure and 
other logistics measures. Section 3 introduces and discusses our modelling approach while section 4 





2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
Lower transport costs would increase trade volumes. Limao & Venables (2001) map information on road, 
rail and phone infrastructure to shipping cost information garnered from freight forwarders.  They 
calculate that infrastructure accounts for 40% of transport costs. In a gravity framework, they find that 
improvements in infrastructure would increase trade materially: a country improving its infrastructure 
from the median to the 75th percentile would increase its trade 68%. A deterioration of infrastructure 
from the median to the bottom quartile would reduce trade volumes by 28%.  
Similarly, Clarke et al (2004) find port facilities and general infrastructure contribute to ocean freight 
costs. These costs, which are based on containerization, the regulatory environment, seaport 
infrastructure and other variables also materially impact trade.2 Nordås & Piermartini (2004) adopt a 
similar approach to Limao & Venables but use more infrastructure measures. They have separate 
specifications for a number of indicators – airports, roads, telephone lines, port efficiency and the median 
port clearance time – which are estimated separately. They find all components to be a significant 
determinant of trade, with port efficiency being the most influential.  
Moving beyond infrastructure, Hummels (2001) finds that improvements in customs clearance sufficient 
to reduce waiting times by a day would be equivalent to a 0.8% point reduction in ad valorem tariffs.3 
Djankov et al (2006) calculate that a delay of one day is equivalent to an additional bilateral distance of 
about 70km. They suggest the delay cost is higher for developing countries because of the nature of their 
exports.  
Wilson et al (2005) define and evaluate four measures of trade facilitation: port facilities, customs 
handling, the regulatory environment and the availability of service sector infrastructure. To do this, they 
combine information from three sources to study manufacturing exports from 75 countries. They find 
that improvements in all four measures would have material impacts on both exports and imports, with a 
bigger impact on exports. They simulate the effect of bringing all countries with below-average measures 
of trade facilitation half way up to the global average. The effect on world trade is an increase of 9.7%, 
with the biggest contribution coming from the service sector infrastructure.  
Limao & Venables (2001) find the median landlocked country trades much less than a coastal country; 
controlling for size and distance, it trades less than half as much. This may be because the incidence of 
transport costs falls on landlocked countries (Amjadi & Yeats, 1995). Limao & Venables calculate that the 
transport cost for the median landlocked country is 55% higher than for the median coastal country. They 
calculate that, for landlocked countries, their own infrastructure accounts for 36% of transit costs but 
infrastructure in the transit countries they use to get to port accounts for an additional 24%. 
Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger (1999) have suggested the landlocked are particularly vulnerable because cross-
national infrastructure projects are difficult to implement, but it’s not just about infrastructure: Gallup et 
al also suggest coastal neighbours may have military or economic incentives to impose costs on the 
landlocked deliberately. As a result, the “Almaty Programme” is aimed at relieving some of the difficulties 
faced by landlocked countries. Goals include recognizing freedom of transit, developing transport 
infrastructure and fostering transnational co-operation (Arvis, Raballiland & Marteau, 2007). These 










3.  MODEL and ESTIMATION ISSUES 
We model the relationship between exports and logistics using a gravity equation. This equation has a 
long and successful history in explaining bilateral trade patterns, with much of the explanatory power 
coming from the two countries’ GDPs and the distance between them. Theory has subsequently provided 
grounding for the empirical success of the gravity model (Anderson 1979, Bergstrand 1985). The theory 
behind the gravity model concludes that physical distance is a proxy for bilateral trade costs.  
Other geographical contributors to transport costs include a country’s land area and whether or not it is 
landlocked or has access to navigable rivers. Broader interpretations of “distance” motivate a wide variety 
of variables that may be thought to affect costs, such as common language and colonial relationships. As 
argued in section 2, gravity models have been used to show that the actual costs incurred can be reduced 
by aspects of physical infrastructure and, more generally, trade facilitation.  
The canonical gravity equation links bilateral trade flows (   ) to the GDPs of the exporting and 
importing countries (   and   ) and the distance between them (    ) Our contribution focuses on the 
logistics indices for the exporter and importer. (li and lj) (equation 1). W is a vector of controls thought to 
proxy for aspects of distance and other country characteristics. All variables are specified in logs, except 
for the logistics index and if otherwise stated.  
 
             .        .        .         .      .              
(equation 1) 
Some additional specifications will include terms for infrastructure in neighbouring countries and 
interactions between logistics and whether or not the countries are landlocked. 
Equation (1) assumes eij is an iid error term, which is uncorrelated with the other explanatory variables in 
the equation. This assumption must hold for consistent estimation of the coefficients. We are in effect 
assuming that any remaining unobserved country-specific effects are uncorrelated with the other 
explanatory variables, which may be invalid (Egger & Pfaffermayr, 2003). Unobserved bilateral fixed 
effects can be controlled for using panel data for some applications, eg Behar & Manners (2008), but the 
logistics index is only available for one period, so we use a single cross-section.  
Simply including country (but not bilateral) dummies would prevent our identifying a number of 
coefficients, including the country-specific logistics indices. Egger (2005) proposes a cross-sectional 
implementation of the Hausman Taylor (1981) estimator to control for unobservables yet still identify the 
fixed variables of interest. Wilson et al (2005) estimate a gravity equation using OLS on their variables of 
interest and subsequently run two separate regressions including exporter (but not importer) and importer 
(but not exporter) fixed effects to see the impact on the other coefficients. This is the approach we 
follow, but cannot completely discount the possibility of invalid correlations due to omitted 
unobservables. 
The iid assumption rules out reverse causation. In gravity models, output causes trade, not the other way 
around, as found for example in canonical growth regressions. Similarly, there is ambiguity regarding the 
relationship between logistics and trade. Equation (1) implies improved logistics allow for higher exports, 
possibly by reducing transport costs. However, it may be that higher trade volumes stimulate the 
construction of new infrastructure and the introduction of more efficient clearance technologies: the 
marginal value of investments in trade facilitating measures may be higher if exports are high, while some 5 
 
aspects of the logistics technology are subject to scale economies and thus only worthwhile at very high 
volume. This could lead to an upward bias in the estimated coefficient. On the other hand, high trade 
volumes may increase the strain on the system, leading to queues at the border and longer customs 
processing times (Djankov et al, 2006).4 
Coe & Hoffmaister (1999) estimate gravity models in multiplicative form rather than adopting a log-linear 
specification. Their justification is that countries reporting zero trade would drop out of the data set, that 
the countries omitted would not be random, and that this would result in inconsistent estimates. 
Helpman, Melitz & Rubinstein (2007) develop a model incorporating selection of bilateral pairs as trading 
partners and construct a two-step estimation procedure embodying this selection process. Their 













4.  DATA and DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
We average merchandise exports data and GDP data for the period 2001-5, using the IMF Direction of 
Trade Statistics. For missing values in a particular year, we assume the missing value is equal to the average 
of the values that are available, as long as there is data for at least one year. If bilateral data reported as 
missing were actually zero or very low, then we would be overstating exports. 
The measure of bilateral distance that we use captures the internal distance in a country and accounts for 
the distance from a number of major cities, constructed by CEPII.6  Border data are also sourced from 
CEPII. This information is used to construct unweighted averages of logistics in a country’s neighbours. 
Islands are excluded from our analysis. 
Our control variables, including landlocked, common language, colonial relationships and land area are 
sourced from CEPII. We also include the proportion of the population within 100 kilometres of a 
navigable river or the coast using data from the Harvard Centre for International Development. 
The logistics performance index is sourced from the World Bank7 and is constructed on a scale from 1-5.  
The logistics performance index is an aggregate of sub-indices, namely: 
i.  Efficiency of the clearance process by customs and other border agencies (customs) 
ii.  Transport and information technology infrastructure (infrastructure) 
iii.  Ease and affordability of international shipments (international) 
iv.  Local logistics industry competence (logistics) 
v.  The facility to track and trace shipments (tracing and tracking) 
vi.  The timeliness with which shipments reach their destination (timeliness) 
The aggregate index is calculated by the World Bank using a principal components analysis of the six8 
different sub-indicators. Table 1 reports the sub-indicators and their weights,9 suggesting that the 




International shipments  0.20 
Logistics competence  0.16 
Tracking and tracing  0.16 
Timeliness 0.15 
Table 1: The components of the logistics 









9 The weights that are used are not reported but can be backed out. For each country we have          
 .    where      is 
the total LPI score,    is a 6x1 vector of the six component scores and    is a 6x1 vector of the weights. We can then use six 




Further details of the construction of each index are available in Arvis, Mustra et al (2007). In summary, 
the index is based on more than 5 000 country evaluations by logistics professionals. Of the 150 countries 
they report, Singapore ranks first and Afghanistan ranks last, with scores of 4.19 and 1.21.  
The perceptions-based measure is corroborated with a variety of qualitative and quantitative indicators. 
For example, Arvis, Mustra et al (2007) calculate that, on average, a one-point rise in the overall logistics 
index corresponds to exports taking three more days to travel from the warehouse to port. Djankov et al 
(2006) contrast Denmark, where goods take 5 days to be cleared for export, with Burundi, where they 
take 67 days. In terms of the logistics index, the scores are 3.86 and 2.29 respectively. Denmark is 
amongst the highest but Burundi is not doing too badly. In fact, it is doing better than a quarter of our 
sample, as shown in Table 2. 
Region Mean 
North America  3.88 
Europe & Central Asia  3.13 
East Asia & Pacific  3.09 
Latin America & Caribbean  2.59 
Middle East & North Africa  2.54 
South Asia  2.49 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.34 





Standard Deviation  0.62 
Table 2: Sample summary statistics for logistics index. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Our effective regression sample consists of about 100-110 countries rather than the 150 countries for 
which the logistics index is available. The difference is in large part due to our omission of islands, 
because of our interest in neighbours’ logistics. Our overall sample statistics are very much in line with 
those for all 150 countries.10  
Table 2 suggests a variation in logistics quality across regions, with Sub-Saharan Africa having the lowest 
average in our sample. However, the 150-country sample gives South Asia approximately the same 
average as Sub-Saharan Africa. The East Asia & Pacific region, which is more affected by the omission of 
islands, has a relatively high mean of only 3.09, while the 150-country sample would generate a mean of 
2.58, placing it below the overall average.  
Our data indicates some dispersion between regions, but there are some large differences within regions 
too (Figure 1). For example, Arvis, Mustra et al (2007) document variation within landlocked countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Many landlocked countries have efficient logistics relative to the rest of the region, 
but many experience overregulated and poor logistics. They also suggest the Eastern side of the continent 
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Much of the variation within Europe & Central Asia in Figure 1 is accounted for by income levels: 
excluding high income countries yields a median of 2.49, which is close to that for the whole sample. 
Despite the large variations, it appears that logistics in Sub-Saharan Africa and in South Asia are generally 
lower than other regions in our sample.11 
In Figure 2, we see evidence of a positive and only slightly concave relationship between the exports of a 
country and its logistics index, without accounting for country income levels. In the next section, we 
provide a more formal analysis of the relationship, taking into account the effects of country size and 







5.  RESULTS 
Table 3 reports our core results based on OLS estimates. Our results were robust to specifications using 
either exporter or importer fixed effects, where the coefficients were remarkably similar. The appendix 
contains these alternative specifications.  
    -1 -2 -3 -4 
Dependent Variable  Exports  Exports Exports Exports 
GDP1  1.308*** 1.133*** 1.081*** 1.097*** 
GDP2  0.985*** 0.911*** 0.845*** 0.861*** 
Distance  -1.516*** -1.483*** -1.369***  ‐1.510*** 
Logistics1 0.772***  0.947***  1.040*** 
Logistics2 0.356***  0.425***  0.523*** 
Logistics*distance  0.436*** 
Area1  0.103*** 0.0856*** 
Area2  0.0561* 0.0372 
Common neighbour  1.067***  0.991*** 
Common official language  0.137  0.146 
Common ethnic language  0.527***  0.405*** 
Exporter ever a colony of importer  0.071  0.165 
Common colonizer  1.304***  1.196*** 
Exporter a colony of importer since 1945  1.402***  1.205*** 
Countries were once the same country  0.533**  0.338 
Proportion of population within river/coast 1  0.00951  0.0338 
Proportion of population within river/coast 2  0.162  0.188 
Landlocked1 -0.0821  -0.0563 
Landlocked2 -0.733***  -0.706*** 
Constant  -28.02*** -25.46*** -26.43*** -26.08*** 
N  11479 11479 10881 10881 
Adjusted R
2  0.677 0.684 0.711 0.717 
Table 3: Results based on OLS regressions. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; country 1 is exporter 
and country 2 is importer. 
 
Column 1 reports the results for the most basic specification, which has three variables. We note that the 
coefficients stay constant across specifications and that these three variables contribute the most in terms 
of explanatory power.12 Column 2 adds the logistics indices for the exporter (Logistics1) and importer 
(Logistics2), suggesting they are positively related to bilateral exports. For example, controlling for 
distance and GDP, a one-unit rise in the exporter’s logistics index would raise its exports by 77.2%.  
Adding a rich set of controls in column 3 increases the estimated coefficients to 0.947 and 0.425 for own 
and partner logistics respectively. Column 3 implies that a one standard deviation rise in logistics quality 
in the exporter would increase exports by 59% (the 95% confidence intervals are at 51% and 66%). Note 
that these simulated improvements are not heroic. They do not require a Guyana to become a Germany 
or Djibouti to become Japan: a one standard deviation change (0.62 units) would move a middle income 
country like Mauritius up to the mean or put Gabon on a par with Guinea.  
In column 4, we interact logistics in both countries with their bilateral distance in deviation form.13 As 
would be expected, the positive sign on the interaction term (Logistics*distance) serves to lessen then 
negative effect of distance on trade.  A one standard deviation rise in logistic in both importer and 
exporter logistics quality would reduce the distance coefficient by 0.54, or one third. However, we note 
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still have a distance coefficient of –0.42.14 This simple exercise suggests that, while this value is less than a 
third of the typical distance coefficient, not even the most advanced countries can kill physical distance.  
We proceed to include the effects of neighbours’ logistics in Table 4. 
   -1  -2 
Dependent Variable  Exports  Exports 
GDP1 1.074***  1.068*** 
GDP2 0.862***  0.866*** 
Distance -1.362***  -1.364*** 
Logistics1 0.896***  0.949*** 
Logistics2 0.545***  0.538*** 
Logistics_neighbour1 0.111  0.0111 





Area1 0.110***  0.122*** 
Area2 0.045  0.0347 
Common neighbour  1.095***  1.087*** 
Common official language  0.141  0.133 
Common ethnic language  0.516***  0.527*** 
Exporter ever a colony of importer  0.0711  0.0703 
Common colonizer  1.313***  1.318*** 
Exporter a colony of importer since 1945  1.407***  1.415*** 
Countries were once the same country  0.485*  0.487* 
Proportion of population within river/coast 1  -0.0033  -0.000634 
Proportion of population within river/coast 2  0.224*  0.230* 
Landlocked1 -0.108  -1.128*** 
Landlocked2 -0.683***  0.216 
Constant -26.54***  -26.49*** 
N 10792  10792 
Adjusted R
2 0.711  0.712 
Table 4: Results including neighbours' logistics based on OLS regressions. 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; country 1 is exporter and country 2 is 
importer. 
 
In column 1, the exporter’s neighbours’ logistics (Logistics_neighbour1) are not significant while the 
importer’s neighbours’ logistics (Logistics_neighbour2) are significant. The control variables in all the 
specifications indicate that landlocked countries tend to trade less overall and, in column 2, we see if our 
neighbourhood findings differ for landlocked countries.  
Focussing on the exporter first, we find that a landlocked country’s own logistics matter less than for 
those who are not landlocked (with a net coefficient of 0.949–0.332=0.617) but that its neighbours’ 
logistics are now significant (with a coefficient of 0.675). A one standard deviation improvement in a 
landlocked country’s logistics together with a one standard deviation improvement in its neighbours’ 
logistics would raise a landlocked country’s exports by 74%.15   
This evidence supports the motivation behind the Almaty accord. Landlocked countries would benefit 
materially from improvements in their neighbours’ logistics quality. Furthermore, there is little incentive 






poor roads or cumbersome bureaucracy. Our simulations illustrate that, if Uganda’s neighbours were to 
increase their average quality by 0.48 units and reach the quality of Zimbabwe’s neighbours while 
Uganda’s logistics remain constant, Uganda’s exports would rise by a third.16  
Turning to the importer, column 2 confirms the negative logistics coefficient seen in column 1, which 
indicates a negative effect of an importer’s neighbours’ logistics quality on exports to that importer. 
Furthermore, the negative effect seems bigger if the importer is landlocked 
(Logistics_border2*landlock2). This may suggest that alternative countries in a region compete as export 
destinations. It may be that the exporter sends all goods to one place to satisfy the region’s demand, with 
local distributors being responsible for the rest. This may reflect in intraregional trade data (and the 
positive significant common border terms, for example), but would be classified as exports to a single 
country. Given this argument, it is no surprise that Singapore and many other countries with good 






6.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our results suggest that logistics quality in the importer and exporter are important for bilateral exports 
and, by implication, trade. Simulation results indicate a one standard deviation improvement in logistics 
quality, which would place Mauritius at the mean or put Gabon on a par with Guinea, would increase a 
country’s exports by 59%. Good logistics can reduce the effects of distance on trade but cannot remove 
it. For a landlocked country’s exports, its own logistics matter less while the neighbours’ logistics quality is 
important. If Uganda’s neighbours were like Zimbabwe’s, Uganda’s exports would rise by a third. Our 
findings also suggest that countries may to some extent compete to be the recipients of goods in a region.  
The results do not change if we include exporter or importer country effects, but we cannot discount the 
possibility that remaining unobservables are affecting our estimates. Our simulations rely on a linear 
causal interpretation of the results, ignoring the possibility of materially decreasing returns to logistics 
quality and feedback effects from exports to logistics quality. The implied linearity in exports effects is 
less likely to hold were all countries to improve their logistics simultaneously. Countries in a region 
competing to be hubs may not find a commensurate increase in trade if they all improve their logistics 
quality. 
We have thus far focussed on logistics as a whole without breaking down the index into its components 
and have measured the effects on aggregate merchandise exports. There is evidence of variations in the 
effects of infrastructure and other indicators by sector (eg Nordås & Piermartini, 2004) and region 
(Wilson et al, 2005; Djankov et al, 2006) and the investigations of such heterogeneity with respect to 
logistics would provide opportunities for further research. 
With these cautions in mind, we conclude that our findings support the view that broad measures of 
logistics can increase trade through reduced transport costs. Realistic steps can be taken to improve 
logistics in many countries. As argued by Wilson et al (2005), administration and legal procedures needn’t 
be expensive. Furthermore, tracking technology and software can be copied by developing countries at 
relatively low cost. Other aspects of infrastructure development would take money, but Buys et al (2006) 
report that both the World Bank and African Development Bank are willing to pay for it.  14 
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   -2 -3 -4 
Dependent Variable  Exports  Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports 
Y1  1.133*** 1.141***    1.081***  1.074***               1.097***  1.090***             
Y2  0.911*** 0.935***  0.845*** 0.848***  0.861*** 0.868*** 
Distance  -1.483*** -1.615*** -1.707*** -1.369*** -1.416*** -1.523***  -1.510*** -1.552*** -1.702*** 
Logistics1  0.772*** 0.761*** 0.947***  0.957***               1.040***  1.043***               
Logistics2  0.356*** 0.337***  0.425*** 0.455***  0.523*** 0.568*** 







Area1  0.103***  0.112***               0.0856***  0.0965***             
Area2  0.0561* 0.0786***  0.0372 0.0582**   
Common border  1.067*** 1.029*** 0.746*** 0.991*** 0.952*** 0.637*** 
Common official language  0.137 0.181  0.433***  0.146 0.173  0.430*** 
Common ethnic language  0.527*** 0.479*** 0.504*** 0.405*** 0.393*** 0.392*** 
Exporter ever a colony of importer  0.071 -0.0269 0.209  0.165 0.0552  0.314**   
Common colonizer+A64  1.304*** 1.149*** 1.143*** 1.196*** 1.072*** 1.036*** 
Exporter a colony of importer since 1945  1.402*** 1.368*** 1.319*** 1.205*** 1.147*** 1.034*** 
Countries were once the same country  0.533** 0.545** 0.512**    0.338 0.336 0.275 
Proportion of population within river/coast 1  0.00951  0.0208               0.0338  0.0456             
Proportion of population within river/coast 2  0.162  0.201*    0.188  0.231**  
Landlocked1  -0.0821  -0.098               -0.0563  -0.0714             
Landlocked2  -0.733*** -0.772***  -0.706*** -0.738*** 
Constant  -25.46*** -5.926*** 3.998*** -26.43*** -9.047***  2.573*** -26.08***  -8.412*** 3.166*** 
N  11479 11479 11479 10881 11179 11175 10881 11179 11175 
Adjusted R
2  0.684 0.714 0.733 0.711 0.73  0.758 0.717 0.736 0.767 
Country 1 dummies?  N N Y N N Y N N Y 
Country 2 dummies?  N Y N N Y N N Y N 
Table A1: Robustness checks for regressions 2-4 in Table 3. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; country 1 is exporter and country 2 is importer. Some bilateral coefficients become 
significant at 5% (many were significant at 10%), but these coefficients are not strictly interpretable in the same way in the presence of additional fixed effects. The interaction 
term involving distance and logistics now strictly only measures the effect with respect to one country, not both. Other regressions suggested the effect of the partners' logistics 




   -1 -2 
Dependent Variable  Exports Exports Exports Exports Exports  Exports 
GDP1  1.074***  1.068***               1.068***  1.062***             
GDP2  0.862*** 0.867***  0.866*** 0.870*** 
Distance  -1.362*** -1.410*** -1.520*** -1.364*** -1.418*** -1.515*** 
Logistics1  0.896***  0.903***               0.949***  0.951***             
Logistics2  0.545*** 0.574***  0.538*** 0.566*** 
Logistics*distance 
Logistics_border1  0.111  0.112               0.0111  0.0164             
Logistics_border2  -0.256*** -0.260***  -0.200** -0.218*** 
Logistics*landlock1  -0.332*  -0.294*             
Logistics*landlock2  0.0501 0.044 
Logistics_border1*landlock1  0.675***  0.642***             
Logistics_border2*landlock2  -0.365* -0.272 
Area1  0.110***  0.118***               0.122***  0.130***             
Area2  0.045  0.0657**   0.0347  0.0571**  
Common border  1.095*** 1.042*** 0.760*** 1.087*** 1.025*** 0.768*** 
Common official language  0.141 0.183  0.436***  0.133 0.167  0.440*** 
Common ethnic language  0.516*** 0.485*** 0.489*** 0.527*** 0.498*** 0.489*** 
Exporter ever a colony of importer  0.0711 -0.0446  0.218  0.0703 -0.0329 0.21 
Common colonizer  1.313*** 1.153*** 1.153*** 1.318*** 1.171*** 1.144*** 
Exporter a colony of importer since 1945  1.407*** 1.370*** 1.347*** 1.415*** 1.400*** 1.331*** 
Countries were once the same country  0.485*  0.545**  0.473*    0.487*  0.538**  0.479*   
Proportion of population within river/coast 1  -0.0033  0.000348               -0.000634  0.00116             
Proportion of population within river/coast 2  0.224*  0.259**   0.230*  0.260**  
Landlocked1  -0.108  -0.123*               -1.128***  -1.150***             
Landlocked2  -0.683*** -0.719*** 0.216  -0.0686 
Constant  -26.54*** -8.676*** 2.622*** -26.49*** -8.477***  2.508*** 
N  10792 11155 11108 10792 11155  11108 
Adjusted R
2  0.711 0.731 0.759 0.712 0.731  0.759 
Country 1 dummies?  N N Y N N  Y 
Country 2 dummies?  N Y N N Y  N 
Table A2: Robustness checks for regressions in Table 4. *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05; country 1 is exporter and country 2 is importer. Some 
bilateral coefficients become significant at 5% (many were significant at 10%), but these coefficients are not strictly interpretable in the same way 
in the presence of additional fixed effects.  
 